“Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction are sufficient to decide this case.” Walden v. Fiore, __ S.Ct. __, 2014 WL 700098, at *8 (2014). With not a touch of irony, this is how the Supreme Court concludes its fourteen-page decision reviewing its precedents on personal jurisdiction before finding it lacking in a case in which the District Court initially determined that personal jurisdiction did not exist, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and a petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the Ninth Circuit with eight judges, in two separate opinions, dissenting. Specifically, the Supreme Court unanimously held that an individual police officer lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada even if he knew that his intentionally tortious conduct in Georgia would affect a person in Nevada.
During a search of Fiore at the San Juan airport in Puerto Rico, TSA agents found almost $97,000 in cash. Id. at *2. Fiore explained that she was a professional gambler and that the money was her gambling “bank” and winnings. The TSA agents in Puerto Rico did not seize the cash and Fiore was permitted to board her flight to Atlanta, where she had a connecting flight to Las Vegas. However, officials at the Puerto Rico airport notified a DEA taskforce at the Atlanta airport of Fiore’s impending arrival. Walden was a police officer in Georgia working as a deputized agent of the DEA. When Fiore arrived in Atlanta, Walden seized the cash. Id. Later, Walden assisted in drafting an affidavit to show probable cause for forfeiture of the funds and sent the affidavit to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Georgia. Ultimately, no forfeiture complaint was filed and the funds were returned to Fiore seven months later. Id. at *3.
Fiore filed a complaint in federal court in Nevada seeking money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). She alleged that Walden violated her Fourth Amendment rights by: (1) seizing the cash without probable cause, (2) keeping the cash after determining that it did not come from drug-related activity, (3) drafting and sending a probable cause affidavit in support of a forfeiture action with knowledge that the affidavit contained false statements, (4) willfully seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory information, and (5) withholding exculpatory information from the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Id.
The District Court in Nevada granted Walden’s motion to dismiss after finding that his search and seizure of the cash in Georgia did not constitute sufficient “minimum contacts” to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Walden in Nevada. On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Although it agreed with the District Court that the search and seizure in Georgia could not support personal jurisdiction in Nevada, the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada could exercise jurisdiction based on the “false probable cause affidavit aspect of the case.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Walden “expressly aimed” his submission of the affidavit at Nevada because he was aware that it would affect Fiore who had a “significant connection” to Nevada. Walden petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc, which was denied with eight judges, in two separate opinions, dissenting. Id.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court began by reviewing the standards for specific jurisdiction. A non-resident defendant must have “certain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’“ Id. at *4 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The inquiry “focuses on the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’“ Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)). That relationship must “arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State,” not his contacts with persons who reside there. Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). Indeed, “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Id. These principles also apply when, as was the case before the Court, intentional torts are involved.
Based on these “[w]ell-established principles of personal jurisdiction,” the Court concluded that Walden did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada to establish personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at **7-8. No part of Walden’s conduct occurred in Nevada. Id. at *7. Instead, Walden undertook his actions solely in Georgia. Thus, “when viewed through the proper lens — whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the forum — [Walden] formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.” The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion by erroneously “shifting the analytical focus from [Walden’s] contacts with the forum to his contacts with [Fiore].” The Ninth Circuit’s analysis “impermissibly allows a plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis.” Id. Further, the fact that Fiore suffered the injury in Nevada was of no moment. “The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id.
Although this case involved an individual defendant, its holding applies equally to corporate defendants. Thus, that a corporate defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff in the forum state is not in and of itself sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction; rather, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state itself.